Heart Attacks and the Pennsylvania Workmen\u27s Compensation Act: Establishing the Causal Relationship Between Employment and Injury by McLemore, R. Burke, Jr.
Volume 81 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 81, 
1976-1977 
10-1-1976 
Heart Attacks and the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation 
Act: Establishing the Causal Relationship Between Employment 
and Injury 
R. Burke McLemore Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
R. B. McLemore Jr., Heart Attacks and the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act: Establishing the 
Causal Relationship Between Employment and Injury, 81 DICK. L. REV. 111 (1976). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol81/iss1/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Heart Attacks and the Pennsylvania Work-
men's Compensation Act: Establishing the
Causal Relationship Between Employment
and Injury
I. Introduction
Heart attacks strike nearly 700,000 Americans each year, many of
whom are under sixty-five years of age and in the prime of their working
lives. Thus the incidence of heart attacks as job-related maladies is of
considerable significance to the workmen's compensation system.
Although the legal distinctions involved in determining whether heart
attacks are compensable under workmen's compensation have occasioned
extensive commentary and judicial interpretation in recent years, the effect
of the 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation
ActI has yet to be examined. The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the
causation requirement of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act
2
as applied to work-related heart attacks. It summarizes briefly the back-
ground and purposes of the statute, examines the difficulties of the
pre-1972 causation requirement, analyzes the present causation require-
ment, and describes the technique whereby the causal link between
employment and heart attack may be established. The comment incorpo-
rates an analysis of the decided cases and concludes with a summary of
how, in actual practice, the law of heart attack compensation relates to the
statutory purposes of the Act.
II. Background
A. The Heart Attack Problem
The American Heart Association estimates that 28,830,000 Ameri-
cans suffer from some form of cardiovascular disease,3 i.e., diseases of the
heart or blood vessels, and that in 1976 approximately 1,060,900 deaths
will be caused by cardiovascular disease-52 percent of all deaths in that
year.4 One-fourth of these victims will be under age sixty-five. 5 Moreover,
1. Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, No. 12; Act of March 29, 1972, P.L. 159, No. 61
[hereinafter referred to as the 1972 amendments].
2. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, No. 338, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1-1603
(Supp. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
3. American Heart Association, 1976 Heart Facts Reference Sheet.
4. Id.
5. Id.
in 1973, 684,066 deaths were caused specifically by heart attack, and
3,990,000 persons alive today have some history of either heart attack or
angina pectoris. 6 In Pennsylvania, cardiovascular disease accounted for
55.14 percent of all deaths in 1973, causing more than three times as many
deaths as cancer and nearly fourteen times as many as accidents. 7 These
statistics underscore the enormity of the problem posed by placing heart
attack victims, a very large segment of the population, under the aegis of
workmen's compensation coverage.
Because this comment focuses principally upon heart attacks, it must
be observed at this juncture that the term "heart attack" is imprecise:
The use of the term "heart attack" is unfortunate insofar as it
is much too general in its implication. "Heart attack" refers to
anything from a brief and transient episode of chest pain to a
severe myocardial infarct resulting from coronary artery throm-
bosis, or even to sudden death. Yet, the term is so deeply
ingrained in the vocabulary of the average layman that it is
probably impossible to replace it with a more specific term.
8
Regrettably, the lay definition is carried over into the case law. Since the
Workmen's Compensation Act is not intended to provide general life and
health insurance for employees,9 the need to demonstrate a causal relation-
ship between employment and injury in heart attack claims is clear. The
difficult question in such cases surrounds the precise etiology of a heart
attack and springs from two sources: the lack of consensus within the
medical profession regarding the interrelation between work effort or strain
and heart attacks, 10 and the tendency of medical witnesses to look for the
6. Id.
7. American Heart Association, Pennsylvania Affiliate, 1973 Mortality Statistics. For
an interesting comparison indicative of the rise of the problem since 1958, see McLaughlin,
The Compensability of Heart Injuries Under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act,
21 U. Prrr. L. REV. 445, 446 (1960) [hereinafter cited as McLaughlin].
8. Bucklin, Heart Disease and the Law, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 294,295 (1971 Annual).
Accord, R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 30.80, at 30-33 (1976):
This is a mere layman's phrase, the exact meaning of which cannot be defined.
Not infrequently it is used by physicians attempting to explain the situation to a
patient who has suffered sudden acute cardiac embarrassment the result of either
coronary insufficiency or myocardial infarction, fatal or nonfatal.
9. Monahan v. Seeds & Durham, 336 Pa. 67, 6 A.2d 889 (1939); A.P. Green Refrac-
tories Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 172,301 A.2d 914 (1973);
Hinkle v. H.J. Heinz Co., 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 216, 298 A.2d 632 (1972); Rettew v.
Graybill, 193 Pa. Super. 564, 165 A.2d 424 (1960); Wilcox v. Buckeye Coal Co., 158 Pa. Super.
264, 44 A.2d 603 (1945).
10. In almost every contested cardiac case there is a conflict in the testimony of the
medical witnesses regarding the cause of the particular heart attack at issue. Each of the heart
attack cases reviewed by the commonwealth court under the post-1972 law has involved such
a dispute. This issue has generated significant comment in the law reviews. See, e.g., Goshkin,
Legislative Action, the Only Reasonable Solution to the Problems of Workmen 's Compensa-
tion Heart Cases, 5 THE FORUM 329, 335 n.17 (1969-70):
Several years ago a study by a committee of the California Heart Association
pointed up the uncertainty of "reasonable medical certainty" in heart cases. After a
panel of five cardiologists, internists and other physicians well experienced in heart
disease had reviewed 319 compensation cases in an attempt to answer certain
questions pertaining to causation it was found that in only 47 of the 319 cases did all
five doctors agree. In 90 cases four doctors agreed. In 215 cases three agreed and in
48 cases only two could agree, and could not even formulate a majority opinion.
Further, where 101 of the same records were again reviewed by the panel without its
cause of a heart attack while lawyers and the compensation authorities are
concerned only with whether some cause and effect relationship exists. 
11
These problems become particularly acute when claimants attempt to
establish causation despite a predisposing condition, a dilemma that
frequently arises.' 
2
Assume, for example, that a store salesman who engages in very little
physical activity and suffers from an acute arteriosclerotic condition
becomes embroiled in a heated discussion with a customer, feels chest
pains immediately thereafter, and dies some two months later. 13 The cause
of death listed on his death certificate is "myocardial infarction" (heart
attack). From a medical standpoint the infarct was the cause of death. From
the standpoint of the workmen's compensation laws this determination
leaves a great deal to be desired. Legal causation requires far more than a
conclusory statement of myocardial infarction. It requires the tracing of a
causal link between the stress of the decedent's employment and the attack
and subsequent death: a determination that this stress, and not solely the
arteriosclerosis, actually contributed to his death. Thus, the outcome turns
on whether the medical witness can supply the requisite evidence to
connect the heart attack and subsequent death to the decedent's employ-
ment. How this may be done is the subject of a later section of this
comment. 
14
B. Purposes of Pennsylvania's Workmen's Compensation Act
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act arose in 1915
during a period of rapid growth of workmen's compensation legislation in
many states. 15 This statute, superseding the common law and various
knowing the records had been seen previously, in 30 percent of the opinions the
doctors reversed themselves! Heart Claims Under the California Workmen 's Com-
pensation Act, 13 Circulation 448 (1956).
See also McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 452-53:
The precise role of exertion in precipitating heart attack is the subject of consider-
able medical literature. The layman is inclined to leap to a conclusion of cause and
effect relationship based solely on a post hoc basis. It is convenient to assume that
since an attack followed exertion then the exertion must have caused the attack.
Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple for the heart specialist. . . . Even if
exertion is a factor, how much exertion is required is another difficult problem. In
other words, the more the expert witness may know of the heart and its diseases, the
more difficult it may become for him in individual cases to find causality in exertion.
Cf. Dahl, The Inter-Relationship Between Law and Medicine in Workmen's Compensation: A
Comparative Guide for Practitioners, 12 CALIF. W.L. REV. 25, 35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Dahl]:
Heart attacks. . . are often different manifestations of the same cause-tension.
Most of the time their connection to employment is speculative. Dr. Paul Dudley
White, President Eisenhower's cardiologist, said that the only heart condition he
would relate to employment with certainty was corpulmonale, an enlargement of the
heart.
I1. Dahl, supra note 10, at 36-37.
12. A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.83, at 7-181-82 n.95.7
(1973) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
13. This hypothetical case bears a close similarity to the facts presented in Workmen's
Comp. App. Bd. v. Kanell Jewelers, Inc., 22 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1, 347 A.2d 500 (1975),
discussed at notes 92-98 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 139-79 and accompanying text infra.
15. The Act was followed within months by an enabling amendment to the Pennsyl-
employer's liability acts, was intended to remedy deficiencies in prior
laws. 16 The cost of work-related injuries was to be allocated to the
employer, not as the result of any presumption that the employer was
negligent, but because of the inherent hazards posed by the employment.
Compensation to employees for work-related injuries was thus to be
accepted as a cost of production 7 that was to be distributed among the
ultimate consumers of the product:
18
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability
is belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most
dignified and most certain form, financial and medical benefits
for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened
community would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less
satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments
to the most appropriate source of the payment, the consumer of
the product. I
Pennsylvania courts, while considering the Act to be remedial in
nature, have uniformly held that it is to be liberally construed in favor of
claimants. 20 The supreme court has realized from an early date, however,
that a too liberal construction could have Pennsylvania constitutional
overtones. In Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore3' the court held that a
workmen's compensation statute must fulfill at least three requirements to
be constitutionally valid: first, the benefits must meet the test of reason-
ableness; second, injuries must arise in the course of employment to be
compensable; and third, an employer may not be compelled to compensate
the employee of another.
22
While emphasizing the liberal treatment to be accorded claimants
under the Act, courts have been careful to point out that the Act's purpose is
not to provide general life and health insurance for employees.23 As
discussed below, these twin considerations may be difficult to resolve
under current law-particularly when the claim for compensation is
founded upon a heart attack. 24
vania Constitution, PA. CONST. art. III, § 21 (renumbered § 18 by amendment of May 16,
1967).
16. Dupree v. Barney, 193 Pa. Super. 331,163 A.2d 901 (1960); Taylor v. Ewing, 166 Pa.
Super. 21, 70 A.2d 456 (1950); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS, at 34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE COMMISSION].
17. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 34.
18. LARSON, supra note 12, § 3.20, at 17.
19. Id. § 2.20, at 5.
20. Cleland Simpson Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
566, 332 A.2d 862 (1975); United States Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 10 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 247, 309 A.2d 842 (1973); Crucible Steel Co. of America v. Workmen's
Comp. App. Bd., 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 269, 306 A.2d 395 (1973); Gilbert v. Aronomink
Country Club, 214 Pa. Super. 70, 251 A.2d 724 (1969); Allen v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock,
Inc., 180 Pa. Super. 286, 119 A.2d 832 (1956); McAvoy v. Roberts & Mander Stove Co., 173
Pa. Super. 516, 98 A.2d 231 (1953).
21. 334 Pa. 449, 7 A.2d 302 (1939).
22. Id.; A. BARBIERI, PENNSYLVANIA X' ORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE § 2.04, at 6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BARBIERI].
23. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
24. See text following note 181 infra.
C. Law Prior to the 1972 Amendments
Prior to the enactment of the 1972 amendments, the Act required that
an injury result from an "accident" to be compensable. 25 This restriction
on recovery was purely statutory, since the Act's enabling constitutional
amendment required only that there be an "injury." 26 To mandate that the
injury be "by an accident" 27 was, however, consistent with the workmen's
compensation statutes of most states. 28
Dean Larson has explained that the "by accident" requirement
presently in effect in the majority of jurisdictions is merely an arbitrary
boundary, derived from practical considerations and pressed into service to
ensure that only work-related injuries are compensable. It originated in the
legislative fear that if the relationship between work and injury is tenuous,
as in heart attack cases, failure to impose such a limitation would result in
compensating every employee who is "injured" within the time-space
limitations of employment. 29 But the barrier posed by the "by accident"
requirement proved to be far more formidable than originally envisioned,
particularly in light of the intended liberal construction of the Act. 30 As a
result, courts began to fashion various doctrines that gradually undercut the
requirement.
1. The Unusual Pathological Result Doctrine
One of these doctrines was the "unusual pathological result" doc-
trine, first enunciated in Parks v. Miller Printing Machine Co.3 Judge
Barbieri reports 32 that this doctrine stemmed from the pre-1972 require-
ment of "violence to the physical structure of the body." 33 This phrase was
the basis for broadening the concept of "accident" to include cases in
which an employee, while engaged in his usual work, suffered an unex-
pected or untoward result as a consequence thereof.34 When applied to
25. Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 520, No. 281, § 101; Act of June 4, 1937, P.L. 1552, No.
323, § 101; Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, No. 338, § 301. The term "accident," however,
remained undefined in the Act. Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, 191 A.2d 694
(1963).
26. The pertinent language of the amendment reads:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by employers, or
employers and employees jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to emp-
loyees arising in the course of their employment, and for occupational diseases of
employees, whether or not such injuries or diseases result in death, and regardless of
fault of employer or employee ...
PA. CONST. art. III, § 21 (renumbered § 18 by amendment of May 16, 1967) (emphasis added).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (1952).
28. At present, only California, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island and Texas do not require the injury to arise by an "accident" to be
compensable.
29. Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and
Suggested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 467-68 (1967).
30. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
31. 336 Pa. 455, 9 A.2d 742 (1939).
32. BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 3.11, at 19-20.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952).
34. See, e.g., Parks v. Miller Printing Mach. Co., 336 Pa. 455,9 A.2d742 (1939); Hinkle
v. H.J. Heinz Co., 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 216, 298 A.2d 632 (1972). For an enlightening
discussion of this doctrine see McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 472.
internal injuries, the doctrine required that the break, disruption, or lesion
be sudden or unusual under ordinary circumstances." There remained,
however, a significant limitation upon application of the doctrine: recov-
ery was barred if the employee suffered from a predisposing condition or
ailment that contributed to the resultant injury. 36 As applied to heart attacks
this restriction barred many otherwise meritorious claims.
37
2. The Unusual Strain Doctrine
In the trend of further liberalization, the courts adopted a second
approach to mitigate the "by accident" requirement: the "unusual strain"
doctrine.38 Unlike the unusual pathological result doctrine, the unusual
strain doctrine did not bar recovery when the employee suffered from a
predisposing condition or ailment that contributed to the injury.39 Courts
adopting this approach reasoned that an employer takes his employees as
he finds them, with all of their strengths and weaknesses, 40 and that as long
as the employee is performing an unusual task when an injury results, an
award is proper. As the test was formulated, there was some indication that
the determination whether the employee's activities had been "unusual"
would be made in comparison with the normal employment activities of the
profession. 4' But in 1969 the supreme court held that recovery would
depend upon the individual employee's work patterns.4 2 Even in its
expanded form, however, the doctrine still posed serious hardships for
35. BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 3.11, at 21.
36. See Page's Dept. Store v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., II Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
126, 309 A.2d 169 (1973); Hinkle v. H.J. Heinz Co., 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 216, 298 A.2d
632 (1972). This result is logical because
it could hardly be argued that the physical breakdown was fortuitous, untoward or
unpredictable as an "accident," if the breakdown could be to some degree predict-
able medically in view of preexisting physical circumstances. To put it conversely, it
is fortuitous, untoward and unpredictable for a physically healthy and previously
unaffected member or structure of the body to suffer injury from normal use.
BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 3. 11, at 21.
37. See, e.g., Good v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Prop. &Supplies, 346Pa. 151, 30A.2d434
(1943) (benefits denied to widow of employee who suffered heart attack after lifting 60-100
pounds of pipefittings to his shoulder, because he suffered from a preexisting arteriosclerotic
condition); Crispin v. Leedom & Worrall Co., 341 Pa. 325, 19 A.2d 400 (1941) (claimant who
suffered heart attack while pushing loaded truck weighing some 1800 pounds, and who was at
that time 58 years old and suffering from chronic arteriosclerosis, denied recovery); Rettew v.
Graybill, 193 Pa. Super. 564,_165 A.2d 424 (1960) (recovery denied on basis of contribution of
preexisting condition to heart attack); Wilcox v. Buckeye Coal Co., 158 Pa. Super. 264, 44
A.2d 603 (1945) (same).
38. See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 459 (general discussion and explanation of the
unusual strain doctrine).
39. Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90,252 A.2d 601 (1969); Borough of Aliquippa v.
W orkmen's Comp. App. Bd., 18 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 340, 336 A.2d 450 (1975); A alker v.
Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 18 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 168, 334 A.2d 844 (1975).
40. See LARSON, supra note 12, § 12-20, at 3-231 to 3-249; Dahl, supra note 10, at 32;
Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. 446, 236 A.2d 819 (1967) (dissent) (wherein
Hoffman, J., reports this as the settled rule), rev'd, 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969).
41. Hamer v. Rishel, 147 Pa. Super. 585, 24 A.2d 664 (1942), discussed in Hamilton v.
Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 98 n. 10, 252 A.2d 601, 604 n. 10 (1969).
42. Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969).
heart attack claimants, particularly when the claimant's "usual" work was
strenuous .
43
3. The Impact Rule
The third attempt to soften the harsh "by accident" requirement came
about recently when, in Stump v. Follmer Trucking Co.,44 the supreme
court rejected the "impact rule" standard for workmen's compensation
cases. In so doing, the court overruled previous holdings that emotional
reactions or shock could not satisfy the causation requirement in heart
attack cases. Noting that the impact rule was inconsistent with its recent
decisions in both Hamilton v. Procon, Inc.45 and Niederman v. Brodsky,46
the court stated:
It seems inconsistent, if a coronary thrombosis can be pre-
cipitated, or caused or contributed to either by physical trauma or
emotional excitement that the courts should be willing to accept
the physical as causative, but reject the emotional, given the
present state of medical knowledge.47
Thus emotional or psychological excitement that brought about an acute
coronary thrombosis or aggravated an existing thrombosis could hence-
forth supply the causational basis for a workmen's compensation award.
4. Dissatisfaction with the Liberalized "By Accident" Require-
ment: Winds of Legislative Change
Despite purported liberalization of the "by accident" requirement,
what had actually evolved was a relatively formless mass of judicial
interpretations that often barred meritorious claims on the basis of micro-
scopic distinctions and provided little guidance to the courts or to attorneys
counseling clients on the merits of their cases.' In 1969, in Hamilton v.
43. See, e.g., American St. Gobain Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 11 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 388,393, 314 A.2d 40,42-43(1974): "[T]hough the work is hard, if it is, as
here, of the same kind and quantity and done in the same manner as it has been performed in
the past, disability resulting from the exertion does not constitute an accident." Accord,
McGowan v. Upper Darby Pet Supply, 207 Pa. Super. 329, 217 A.2d 846 (1966) (recovery
denied claimant meat cutter who suffered heart attack after lifting 100-125 pound slab of meat,
since this was part of his usual work).
44. 448 Pa. 313, 292 A.2d 294 (1972).
45. 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969). See note 42 supra; notes 49-51 and accompanying
text infra.
46. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). This case abolished the impact rule as a requirement
for tort liability.
47. 448 Pa. at 317, 292 A.2d at 296.
48. See Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. 446, 460, 236 A.2d 819, 826-27 (1967)
(dissent).
The profuse litigation revolving around the accident concept has not only built
up a retaining wall against liability in heart cases by a distortion of the language of the
Act in light of its derivation and legislative purpose, but has also provided a great
source of difficulty in defining a workable rule.
Id. at 460, 236 A.2d at 826.
Accord, Comment, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis of Persistent
Problems and Recent Legislative Reform, 75 DICK. L. REV. 445, 453 (1972).
Procon, Inc.,49 the supreme court was presented with the opportunity to
remedy this situation by abrogating the unusual strain doctrine in favor of
an alternative theory, the "usual strain" doctrine. This "New Jersey
Rule" provided that if the ordinary stress and strain of employment-
whether or not coupled with predisposing heart ailments-plays a substan-
tial, i.e., non-trivial, part in a heart attack, a compensable injury arises.50
Refusing to adopt this rule, the court reasoned that "such a major
change" was a matter for the legislature:
The adoption of a totally new concept such as the "New
Jersey Rule" should be preceded by legislative investigations in
an effort to determine the latest medical knowledge concerning
the connection between heart attacks and employment strain.
Furthermore, we as a court are not in a position to study the
possible consequences from an insurance standpoint of the adop-
tion of a more liberalized rule for recovery in heart attack cases.
We cannot and should not, as a judicial body, convert workmen's
compensation coverage into general group life and health insur-
ance coverage. Therefore, we urge the legislature to undertake a
study of the desirability of revising Pennsylvania's unusual strain
doctrine."
III. Current Causational Requirements
A. The Amended Workmen's Compensation Act
Apparently taking its cue from the language in Hamilton, in 1972 the
Pennsylvania legislature passed a sweeping package of amendments5 2
directed at, interalia, the elimination of the "by accident" requirement for
compensable injuries with its attendant confusion.5 3 The pertinent section
of the Act, section 301(c)(1), 54 which redefines "injury" and "personal
injury," is liberal in comparison to its predecessor:
The terms "injury" and "personal injury," as used in this
act, shall be construed to mean [only violence to the physical
structure of the body] an injury to an employee, regardless of his
previous physical condition, arising in the course of his employ-
ment and related thereto, and such disease or infection as natur-
ally results [therefrom] from the injury or is aggravated, reacti-
vated or accelerated by the injury; and wherever death is men-
tioned as a cause of compensation under this act, it shall mean
only death resulting from such [violence] injury and its resultant
effects, and occurring within three hundred weeks after the
[accident] injury. The term ["injury by an accident in the course
of employment"] "injury arising in the course of his employ-
ment," as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by
49. 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969).
50. See LARSON, supra note 12, § 38.64(b), at 7-134. The landmark cases establishing the
New Jersey "usual strain" rule are Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161(1962)
(noted in 29 NACCA L.J. 223 (1962-63)) and Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish & Insul. Co., 27 N.J.
127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958).
51. 434 Pa. at 97, 252 A.2d at 604.
52. See note 1 supra. An early review of these amendments can be found in Comment,
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis of Persistent Problems and Recent
Legislative Reform, 76 DICK L. REV. 445 (1972).
53. See note 48 supra.
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (Supp. 1975).
an act of a third person . . . but shall include all other injuries
sustained while the employee is actually engaged in the further-
ance of the business or affairs of the employer. .... 5.
There are four major changes in the section of the Act defining
"injury." First, the "by accident ' 56 and "violence to the physical
structure of the body" requirements are deleted. In their place is simply the
need to establish an "injury." Second, compensation may now be awarded
in all cases without regard to the previous physical condition of the
employee. Third, the injury must not only arise in the course of employ-
ment but must also be related thereto. Finally, diseases or infections that
are aggravated, accelerated or reactivated by the injury are now
compensable.
These changes solve most, if not all, of the problems of recovery
under prior "by accident" law, eliminating the necessity of pleading a
twist or slip in order to show an accident, 57 removing the bar to recovery
posed by predisposing ailments or conditions under the unusual pathologi-
cal result doctrine, 58 and making it unnecessary to show any unusual
exertion as was required under the unusual strain doctrine.
5 1
In its form and interpretation the current Pennsylvania statute regard-
ing the compensability of heart attacks closely resembles the "usual
strain" rule6° judicially propounded in New Jersey. 6' Thus, under present
law, if an employee suffers a heart attack either precipitated or contributed
to by the ordinary stress and strain62 of employment, such injury is
compensable. This is true even though the employee may be suffering from
a predisposing illness or condition rendering him or her more susceptible to
attack. 63 The primary inquiry of the current Pennsylvania Act is whether a
55. Id. (Deleted portions from previous § 411 are bracketed; new material is italicized).
56. This specific change is in accord with the recommendations of the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION,
supra note 16, at 49.
57. See Comment, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis of Persistent
Problems and Recent Legislative Reform, 76 DICK. L. REV. 445, 453 (1972):
The accident requirement put a premium on sharp pleading, i.e., it became necessary
to plead a slip or a twist when perhaps those words would not have been in the
employee's initial description of his accident.
This was apparently necessitated by the requirement of a showing of "violence to the physical
structure of the body." See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
60. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
61. "As is readily apparent, the Act of 1972 has now basically made the injury without
accident phase of of the New Jersey rule the law of Pennsylvania." BARBIERI, supra note 22, §
3.15, at 26.
62. The term "stress and strain," as opposed to the terms "exertion" and "overexer-
tion," is more frequently employed in medical circles. Its use by the courts aids in avoiding
the problems generated by the latter terms when used in conjunction with the unusual strain
doctrine and the impact rule. At least one other non-"by accident" state prefers to use the
phrase "stress and strain." See McMurray's Case, 331 Mass. 29, 116 N.E.2d 847 (1954). This
appears, also, to be the approach adopted by the New Jersey courts. SeeDwyer v. Ford Motor
Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962); Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish & Insul. Co., 27 N.J. 127,
141 A.2d 761 (1958).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (Supp. 1975). Again, this is the New Jersey approach:
direct causal link can be established between employment and injury.
With regard to the burden of proof resting on a claimant, however, the
New Jersey Rule and the Pennsylvania Act are dissimilar. New Jersey
requires proof of causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 64 Although
this may be a reasonable burden for the claimant to bear, there is no such
requirement in Pennsylvania. The burden resting on a Pennsylvania
claimant is that of bringing "substantial" evidence, actually much less
than a preponderance. 65 This light burden of proof is an objectionable
aspect of Pennsylvania's workmen's compensation law from the em-
ployer's standpoint.
As noted previously, 66 in order to be compensable an injury must not
only arise in the course of employment, but must also be related thereto.6 7
The test for compensability under the Act, therefore, is two-pronged. The
employee must first have been engaged in the furtherance of the business or
affairs of his employer (i.e., the injury must be one arising within the
time-space limitations of employment). Second, the injury must be shown
to have been causally related to the employment .68 This second require-
ment is derived from the language "related thereto" found in section
301 (c)(1) of the Act ,69 and was incorporated by the legislature to insure that
only work-related injuries are compensated. While posing an evidentiary
barrier to spurious claims, it allows greater flexibility in proof than did its
arbitrary predecessor, the "by accident" requirement, since it eliminates
the need to point to a particular stressful event that precipitated the injury.
Thus claimants are free to prove that an indirect work factor acted as a
catalyst in bringing about the injury.
Moreover, as far as causation is concerned, the Act establishes the
same standard of proof whether or not an employee suffers from a
predisposing condition. By incorporating the language "regardless of his
previous physical condition" 70 in the definitions of injury and personal
injury, the legislature affirms the principle that employers take their
employees as they find them.7'
[W]here the heart has deteriorated to the point that potentially any appreciable
degree of exertion carries a danger of precipitating, or so acting upon the condition
as to accelerate, a disabling or fatal attack, if the effort or strain, which in fact
precipitates or contributes to the attack, occurs during the course of the employment
and as an ordinary or usual incident of the work, the resulting disability or death is
compensable.
Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 491, 178 A.2d 161, 163 (1962) (emphasis added).
64. Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962). New Jersey also
requires that the employment activity contribute in a material degree (a degree greater than de
minimis) to the injury. Id. Accord, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 51
(recommending compensation when the employment factor is a "significant" cause of
disability or death).
65. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text infra.
66. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (Supp. 1976).
68. This second requirement is merely evidentiary.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (Supp. 1976).
70. Id.
71. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
B. Case Law Under the Amended Act
The commonwealth court has reviewed five cases in which the 1972
amendments were applied to heart attacks. 72 In all five cases the court
affirmed awards of benefits made by the referee.
The first heart attack case to reach the commonwealth court was
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Jeddo Highland Coal Co.,
7 3
in which the court upheld the board in affirming a referee's award of
benefits to a claimant whose husband had suffered a fatal heart attack while
performing his "usual" duties. The court noted that the usual-unusual
exertion distinction is no longer determinative ,74 although it did stress the
fact that decedent's recent work had been physically taxing:
His job was somewhat unusual in that he worked 7 days a week
for at least 11 months prior to his death. He died . . . [while]
attempting to move a heavy cable, a task which decedent had
performed many times before.
75
The court ruled that no "accident" need occur, but that an "injury,"
as redefined by the Act, will suffice. By affirming the award of benefits in
this case, the court made clear that work-related heart attacks will continue
to be compensable "injuries" under the amended Pennsylvania Work-
men's Compensation Act.
76
The Jeddo decision stands for several other significant propositions
that were to become the foundation for recent heart attack cases. First, as in
all compensation cases, the burden lies upon the claimant to prove that a
compensable injury has been suffered. 77 Second, the test of a compensable
injury is two-fold: 78 (1) the claimant must demonstrate that the employee's
heart attack arose in the course of employment, i.e., that the employee was
engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer; and
(2) the claimant must show that the attack was causally related to the
employment, i.e., that there was a "causal connection between [the
employee's] work and [the] injury.' 7 Third, conflicts in medical causa-
tion testimony are to be resolved by the referee, whose resolution is binding
upon the courts. Thus, medical testimony indicating causation may supply
72. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., - Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
357 A.2d 707 (1976); Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Ayres Philadelphia, Inc., - Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. -, 351 A.2d 306 (1976); N orkmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Kanell Jewelers,
Inc., 22 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1,347 A.2d 500 (1975); Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Auto
Express, Inc., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559, 346 A.2d 829 (1975); N orkmen's Comp. App.
Bd. v. Jeddo Highland Coal Co., 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 90, 338 A.2d 744 (1975).
73. 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 90, 338 A.2d 744 (1975).
74. Id. at 93 n.3, 338 A.2d at 746 n.3.
75. Id. at 92, 338 A.2d at 746 (emphasis added).
76. As early as 1961 it was explicitly held that a heart attack could constitute an
"injury" for workmen's compensation purposes. The heart attack, in itself, however, was
not an "accident," and without a showing of the requisite "accident" there could be no
recovery. See Baur v. Mesta Mach. Co., 195 Pa. Super. 22, 168 A.2d 591 (1961) (noted by
Blatt, J., in City of Philadelphia v. Hays, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 621,320 A.2d 406 (1974)).
77. 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 94 n.5, 338 A.2d at 747 n.5. Unfortunately, the court
did not specifically define the degree of this burden.
78. Id. at 93, 338 A.2d at 746.
79. Id. at 94, 338 A.2d at 747.
the requisite causal link between employment and injury even though
rebuttal testimony is brought.80
Jeddo was followed within months by a second heart attack case,
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Auto Express, Inc.81 In Auto
Express, a truck driver, participating in the routine unloading of his truck
through the use of mechanized forklifts and handtrucks, experienced chest
pains and stopped working after completing a portion of the operation. The
chest pains continued intermittently through the following day, and the
driver was hospitalized for a myocardial infarction. The referee's award of
total disability benefits was affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board and was again affirmed by the commonwealth court in a
decision resting largely on the Jeddo rationale. The court, remarking that
"[t]he facts and legal issues involved in Jeddo are remarkably similar to
those at hand," 82 applied the two-part injury test of Jeddo.83 Moreover, it
reiterated the Jeddo statement that the resolution of conflicting medical
causation testimony is within the sole province of the referee and that the
courts, on review, are bound by the referee's determinations.
84
The Auto Express court made two particularly noteworthy points. The
first deals with the burden of proof upon a claimant to support a referee or
board determination:
In this type of case, where the Board has affirmed an award
of a referee granting benefits to a claimant, our scope of review is
limited to a determination of whether there is substantial compe-
tent evidence in the record to support any necessary findings of
fact and whether the Board and referee have committed an error
of law. 5
The court later defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" 86
The second notable point in Auto Express deals with the adequacy of
the testimony of a claimant's medical witness to establish the causal
relationship between employment and the heart attack. As a rule, when
80. Id. at 95, 338 A.2d at 747. This particular holding raises serious questions. See notes
115-23 and accompanying text infra.
81. 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559, 346 A.2d 829 (1975).
.82. Id. at 562, 346 A.2d at 831.
83. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
84. 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 563, 346 A.2d at 832.
85. Id. at 561, 346 A.2d at 831 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at561, 346 A.2d at831. SeeColumbus Serv. Int'l & Underwriters AdjustingCo.
v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 333 A.2d 233 (1975) (same
definition).
After quoting claimant's medical witness, however, the court said: "The above tes-
timony in its totality constitutes sufficient competent evidence to support the referee's finding
as to causation." 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 565, 346 A.2d at 833 (emphasis added). This
seemingly interchangeable use of the terms "substantial" and "sufficient" has led to some
confusion (see Siegel, Workmen's Compensation Law, 47 PA. B. ASSN' Q. 134,144 (1976)). It
is felt, however, that the true test of a claimant's burden of proof is the "substantial
evidence" standard. See Novaselec v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 16 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 550, 332 A.2d 581 (1975). The term "sufficient" merely connotes that this burden has in
fact been met. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Mifflin-Juniata State Health Foundation, 19
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 133, 338 A.2d 691 (1975).
medical testimony is called for, the witness must present an unequivocal
statement of opinion regarding causation.87 Assertions of probabilities
generally do not meet this test.88 In Auto Express, however, the court held
that, despite the testimony of claimant's witness that the employment
activity was the "probable cause" 89 of the attack, his later testimony that
"this man overexerted himself, and I feel that would be the cause of the
initial attack"' rendered his testimony, regarded in its entirety, suffi-
ciently unequivocal to establish causation.
91
Auto Express was followed shortly by a third heart attack case,
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Kanell Jewelers, Inc. ,92 and
Jeddo was again cited as controlling. 93 In Kanell, a jewelry salesman
suffered a myocardial infarction at work and died as a result some two and
one-half months later. The referee determined that the injury was compens-
able and awarded death benefits to decedent's wife and minor children.
Both the board and the commonwealth court affirmed.
Briefs of counsel and the record below raise two significant issues not
mentioned in the Kanell opinion. First, the decedent's heart attack was
found by the referee to have been precipitated not by strenuous physical
exertion, but by a stressful, emotional argument with a customer. 94 By
holding that the record adequately established the causal connection
between work and the heart attack, 95 the court impliedly held that the
"impact rule" was not carried forward under the revised Act and, more
importantly, that emotional stress can lead to a compensable heart attack. 96
Second, it is significant that this particular decedent was suffering from a
predisposing myocardial condition at the time of his fatal attack. The
referee found
that the injury of May 13, 1972 set in motion a chain of events
which aggravated a non-disabling myocardial condition, thereby
causing, directly and substantially, the death of claimant's dece-
dent on July 25, 1972 from said myocardial infarction. 97
By confirming that the referee's findings had adequate support in the
record98 the court impliedly ruled, as would be expected under the 1972
amendments, that predisposing conditions or ailments will not bar a heart
87. See notes 14043 and accompanying text infra.
88. See notes 143-52 and accompanying text infra.
89. 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 564, 346 A.2d at 833 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 565, 346 A.2d at 833.
91. Id. at 565, 346 A.2d at 833.
92. 22 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1, 347 A.2d 500 (1975).
93. Id. at 3, 347 A.2d at 501. The court also noted the similarity between this case and
Auto Express (discussed at notes 81-91 and accompanying text supra). Id. at3 n.2,347 A.2d at
501 n.2.
94. Record, at 91a (referee's Findings of Fact No. 9).
95. 22 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 3-4, 347 A.2d at 501.
96. This conclusion is bolstered by the court's finding that there was "no meaningful
factual dissimilarity" between the Jeddo and Auto Express cases (in which physical effort was
the causative factor) and the present case (in which physical exertion did not play a part in the
attack). See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
97. Record, at 91a (referree's Finding of Fact No. 5).
98. 22 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 3-4, 347 A.2d at 501.
attack claim when a causal connection between employment and the attack
can properly be shown.
The fourth judicially decided heart attack case applying the 1972
amendments is Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Ayres
Philadelphia, Inc.99 In Ayres, claimant's decedent was a seventy-one year
old man employed as a "cutter and spreader" 100 who, prior to the attack,
suffered from a number of predisposing conditions, including hyperten-
sion, chemical diabetes, and cardiac irregularity. The evidence brought
before the referee indicated that the decedent was found dead, lying face
up, next to a table where he had been performing his usual tasks. The
undisputed cause of death was myocardial infarction. Claimant's medical
evidence consisted of the testimony of decedent's physician, an osteopath
engaged in general practice. Finding that this evidence supplied the
requisite causal connection between decedent's work and his attack and
subsequent death, the referee granted an award and the board affirmed. 0 '
The commonwealth court affirmed the decision of the board. Relying again
on Jeddo, the court noted that the claimant had met the two-part test of
proving a compensable injury by demonstrating that the heart attack arose
in the course of employment and was related thereto. 02 The rebuttal of the
testimony of claimant's medical witness by the testimony of a cardiologist
was held immaterial because the conflict was resolved by the referee as was
within his province.1
0 3
The fifth and final case to construe the 1972 amendments as they
apply to heart attack compensation claims is Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board v. Bernard S. Pincus Co,1 4 in which a truck driver was
killed by a heart attack upon his return to work after lunch. Before lunch
decedent had been performing his usual tasks, moving packaged meat
products from inside a truck to the tailgate where they could be unloaded by
others, and had completed approximately half of the job. On these facts the
referee awarded benefits; the board and the court affirmed.
In its opinion, the commonwealth court declined to set forth "an
ecumenical definition of 'injury' ," 105 holding such a definition unneces-
sary to the determination whether a heart attack was a compensable injury
under the Act. The court simply ruled that
where a decedent, as here, was performing his usual job assign-
ment at the time of his fatal heart attack, and the connection
between his work and the heart attack was supported by tes-
99. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 351 A.2d 306 (1976).
100. The term "cutter and spreader" denotes a person whose job consists of laying
pieces of fabric on a work table and cutting them to the desired sizes.
101. The case was originally remanded by the board to the referee because the referee
had failed to make a specific finding that there had been an "injury." After the referee made
this requisite finding, the award was affirmed by the board.
102. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at -, 351 A.2d at 307-08.
103. Id. at , 351 A.2d at 308.
104. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at , 357 A.2d 707 (1976).
105. Id. at -, 357 A.2d at 708.
timony of a physician, that the death was directly related to his
work, decedent's claimant was entitled to benefits.'°6
The four cases previously discussed were cited in support of the court's
decision.
Of note is the fact that the decedent in Pincus was not actually working
at the time he suffered his fatal attack. Rather, he was returning from lunch
and "walking along the loading dock toward his truck" when he died. 107
The fact that an award of benefits in a case such as this was confirmed by
the court clearly demonstrates that a heart attack claimant need not pinpoint
a specific work incident that precipitated the attack in order to be entitled to
compensation. The holding further intimates that the victim need not be
"at work" when the attack occurs for claimant to recover-that he could,
for example, be on his way home from work. The salient inquiry remains
whether a causal connection between employment and injury can be
established.
These five cases have shown that claimants must no longer demon-
strate anything "unusual," either in the way of work effort or "pathologi-
cal result," to be entitled to an award. This means that heart attack
claimants previously prevented from recovering because they could not fit
their cases into either of the judicially enumerated categories of "acci-
dents" will now be entitled to awards if they can adequately establish a
causal relationship between employment and the heart attack. For exam-
ple, under pre-1972 law, an employee whose "usual" work was strenuous
enough to trigger an attack in some normal individuals, yet who suffered a
predisposing cardiovascular condition contributing to the attack, would
have been barred from recovering under both the unusual strain and
unusual pathological result doctrines. Now, upon adequate proof of causal
connection, he will be entitled to an award. The cases have not, however,
indicated a trend toward accepting a de minimis work factor as adequate
causation. On the contrary, the commonwealth court has emphasized the
need to show a direct relationship between employment and injury. 108 The
stress and strain of employment, either alone or in conjunction with other
factors, must play a substantial part in the resulting injury.
IV. Establishing the Causal Relationship
The need to establish a direct causal relationship between employ-
ment and injury has received primary consideration to this point. The focus
of the remainder of the comment is upon the process by which this
relationship can be established.
A. Role of the Referee
Initially, it is crucial to realize that the workmen's compensation
referee is the sole trier of fact. He alone is charged with the responsibility to
106. Id. at -, 357 A.2d at 708 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at -, 357 A.2d at 707.
108. Id. at -, 357 A.2d at 708.
weigh testimony and resolve issues of credibility.'09 His factual determina-
tions are binding on the appeal board unless the board takes additional
evidence. 10 The board may consider additional evidence only if it believes
the referee's findings of fact to be unsupported by competent evidence. I"'
If the board takes no additional evidence, the referee's decision is revers-
ible by the courts only if he has violated consitutional rights, committed an
error of law, or made findings of fact that are not supported by substantial
competent evidence. 112
The term "substantial evidence" has already been encountered," 3
and the term "competent evidence" in this context has been held to mean
"legally competent" or "answering all requirements of the law." 114 Thus,
if the referee's findings of fact rest upon such relevant and legally
competent evidence as a reasonable man might accept as adequate to
support them, they become virtually immune from attack either by the
board or the courts. 11 5 Medical causation is such a fact. The result is that
the referee, generally a layman, resolves complex medical-factual ques-
tions, and his resolution of these key questions, necessarily determinative
of the outcome, is practically unassailable.
This virtual unreviewability, coupled with the light burden of proof
109. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Auto Express, Inc., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559,
346 A.2d 829 (1975); Aluminum Co. of America v. Theis, I I Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 587, 314
A.2d 893 (1974); Hoy v. Fran Lingerie, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 542, 308 A.2d 640 (1973);
Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Krawczynski, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 176, 305 A.2d 757
(1973).
110. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Auto Express, Inc., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559,
346 A.2d 829 (1975); Commercial Laundry, Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 17 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 297, 331 A.2d 230 (1975); Dunn v. Merck & Co., Inc., 12 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 572, 317 A.2d 657 (1974); Hoy v. Fran Lingerie, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 542, 308
A.2d 640 (1973).
I11. Forbes Pavilion Nursing Home v. W orkmen's Comp. App. Bd., 18 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 352, 336 A.2d 440 (1975).
112. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Auto Express, Inc., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559,
346 A.2d 829 (1975); Dunlap v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 19,
330 A.2d 555 (1975).
113. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
114. Vorbnoff v. Mesta Mach. Co., 286 Pa. 199, 133 A. 256 (1926). This definition,
admittedly imprecise, is the best available in Pennsylvania workmen's compensation case
law. Its likely interpretation is that "competent" should be taken in the sense of the
common-law rules of evidence.
115. The referee's findings are, of course, subject to reversal for capricious disregard of
competent evidence, but the burden of showing such disregard is heavy: "Capricious
disregard has been defined as the wilful and deliberate disbelief of an apparently trustworthy
witness whose testimony one of ordinary intelligence could not possibly challenge." Rice v.
A. Steiert & Sons, Inc., 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 264, 272, 301 A.2d 919, 923 (1973).
Moreover, given the tendency of the courts to hold that the trier of fact may reject in whole or
in part the testimony of any witness, American Steel & Wire Div. v. Fesh, 4 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 84, 286 A.2d 10(1972); Walker v. Heavey, 207 Pa. Super. 528,219 A.2d 466(1966);
Hauptle v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 206 Pa. Super. 292, 212 A.2d 902(1965); Halloway v.
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 173 Pa. Super. 137, 96 A.2d 171 (1953), and may reject even
uncontradicted testimony, Wolfe v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 215 Pa. Super.
382, 258 A.2d 870 (1969); Smith v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 194 Pa. Super. 263, 166
A.2d 299 (1960); Stampone v. Anthony Daily & Sons, Inc., 188 Pa. Super. 615, 149 A.2d 129
(1959), the burden of showing capricious disregard of competent evidence is nearly
insurmountable.
resting on a Pennsylvania claimant, 16 has led some observers to suggest
that questionable claims are being compensated. " I7 Unlike Pennsylvania,
New Jersey and some other states that impose no "by accident" require-
ment have attempted to alleviate this problem by requiring claimants to
prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. 118 California takes a
different approach, permitting the appeal board to resolve questions of
credibility and to reverse a referee's findings of fact on that basis. " 9
Although in Pennsylvania the appeal board had this power at one time, it no
longer does. 1
20
Given the above combination of factors, a Pennsylvania referee's
finding of "causation" may easily be capricious.' 2 1 This potentiality has
led certain authorities to question whether heart attacks should be covered
under workmen's compensation legislation. 122 Others have urged that
certain minimum criteria be established to guide the referee in making his
determinations and to serve as a standard for review.1 23 Yet the arbitrari-
116. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
117. See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 491:
[T]he untruthful claimant or employer is every bit the menace in these proceedings
that he is in any other litigation. However, the claimant in Workmen's Compensation
litigation does not have the burden of proof required of him elsewhere and for that
reason an unscrupulous witness in this situation is even more dangerous to the
administration of justice.
118. See, e.g., Musselman v. Central Tel. Co., 261 Iowa 352, 154 NW .2d 128 (1967);
Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962); Ruggieri v. Bristol Mfg. Corp., 92
R.I. 365, 168 A.2d 726 (1961); LeBlanc's Case, 334 Mass. 265, 134 N.E.2d 900 (1956).
119. See Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 274, 520 P.2d 978, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 162 (1974).
120. The Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, No. 12, stated that the board could disregard
any findings of fact made by the referee that were not supported by credible evidence. The Act
of March 29, 1972, P.L. 159, No. 61, however, stripped the board of this power by substituting
the word competent for the word credible. Thus, issues of credibility are no longer within the
scope of the board's review. Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Krawczynski, 9 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 176, 305 A.2d 757 (1973).
121. This is the result of the singularly unharmonious state of opinion among the medical
profession concerning the causes of heart attacks (see note 10 and accompanying text supra).
As a consequence, parties are ordinarily able to provide sufficient competent evidence to
support any causation determination the referee might make.
[T]he case for the employee and the case for the defense are generally in stalemate.
The applicant has put on eminent medical experts to testify why some aspect of his
work has caused or aggravated an underlying arteriosclerosis bringing about a
thrombosis or infarct. The defense is certainly not outdone and presents its highly
qualified medical experts to testify why the alleged work effort was merely coinci-
dental to the heart incident. This leaves it to the trier of fact to decide the case in
accordance with his own philosophy, the state of his last electrocardiagram or the
length of his nose.W hatever decision is rendered will be impregnable from attack as
there will be substantial evidence in the record to support it.
Goshkin, Legislative Action, the Only Reasonable Solution to the Problems of Workmen's
Compensation Heart Cases, 5 THE FORUM 329, 329-30 (1969-70) (footnote omitted). See also
McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 491 (remarking that lack of knowledge among compensation
authorities, lawyers and courts about the basic mechanics of heart injury makes a reliable
evaluation of the causal relationship impossible).
122. See Report of the Committee on the Effects of Strain and Trauma on the Heart and
Great Vessels, 26 CIRCULATION 612, 621 (1962).
123. At least three states (Oklahoma, Utah and Washington) have pursued this
approach. See Hellmuth & Hellmuth, Heart Attack and Workmen's Compensation: Model
Rules of Practice, 4 THE FORUM 113 (1968-69); McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 453 (wherein the
Utah plan is discussed).
ness of such criteria in the face of ever-increasing medical knowledge
militates against their use.
Ironically, the factors set forth above, which present a formidable
potential for abuse of the compensation scheme, may have their greatest
detrimental impact on workers who only recently have been fully embraced
by it-those with a history of cardiovascular difficulties. As studies have
shown, these workers may be faced with the prospect of unemployability




The evidence gathering techniques that are an integral part of civil
suits are not emphasized in workmen's compensation proceedings. Dis-
covery is limited, section 422125 setting forth the only major discovery
vehicles available under the Act. Depositions may be taken, but only if the
witness sought to be deposed resides outside the Commonwealth or is
unable to testify because of illness or other cause. 126 Complete copies of
records of medical, surgical or hospital treatment provided by the employer
must be furnished to the employee upon request, and the employee must
reciprocate. 127 The employer enjoys no right, however, to demand an
impartial physical examination, which is granted only at the discretion of
the board and referee.' 28 Despite the obvious desirability of an impartial
examination in a case in which the question of causation is a close one,
129
the referee or board is under no obligation to honor a request for exanina-
tion, 130 nor is it an error of law for them to refuse even to rule on such a
request.' 3 ' Requests for autopsies appear to rest on still more tenuous
124. See, e.g., Hellmuth & Hellmuth, Heart Attack and Workmen's Compensation:
Model Rules of Practice, 4 THE FORUM 113, 115 (1968-69) (footnote omitted):
A survey of Wisconsin industry showed the harm which can result from too
liberal cardiac claim adjudication. About half the employers questioned reported
that they avoid hiring new cardiac applicants; 48% of these gave the threat of
workmen's compensation costs as a reason.
Accord, E. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY INTHE COURSEOF EMPLOYMENT, at 332-33 (1961); 49
Ky. L.J. 394, 395-96 (1961).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 835 (Supp. 1975).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 831 (Supp. 1975); Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Auto
Express, Inc., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559, 346 A.2d 829 (1975); Workmen's Comp. App.
Bd. v. Republic Steel Corp., 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 495, 338 A.2d 762 (1975). The
statutory language makes no provision for motion of the parties; rather, it states that the
board, department, or referee may, of its own motion, order such an examination. Cf. PA. R.
Civ. P. 4010(a), providing that in civil cases a party may move the court to order examination.
129. But see Dahl, supra note 10, at 52, arguing that such a procedure is necessary only
when physicians have become "so polarized toward either the applicant or defendant that the
boards have to call in an independent examiner to get objective findings and estimates." In all
other cases, he states, the process becomes unduly expensive and time consuming.
130. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Auto Express, Inc., 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 559,
346 A.2d 829 (1975).
131. Id. But see Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Republic Steel Corp., 19 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 495, 338 A.2d 762 (1975) (suggesting that when the amount and quality of medical
testimony actually introduced in a given case is low, it may be an abuse of discretion to refuse
a request for impartial examination).
grounds. The power of the board or referee to order an autopsy (if such a
Power actually exists) would be rooted in section 422 of the Act, 13 2 which
establishes the investigatory powers of both board and referees. Again,
strong arguments may be advanced for an autopsy when the etiology of a
heart attack is questionable.' 33 On this subject Judge Barbieri reports:
The question has arisen as to whether or not the investigatory
power of the referee would include the power in a death case to
order that an autopsy be performed. It has generally been con-
ceded that the referee has no such power, but autopsies are
performed by agreement of the deceased's dependents in many
cases in order to resolve the questions concerning the cause of
death which are vital to the right to recover. Agreement to permit
autopsy is particularly likely to be granted in view of decisions
which hold that the failure to permit an autopsy can be used
against the claimant who refuses it. These decisions are founded
upon the logical view that if the cause of death may only be
determined through autopsy, and this means for determining the
cause of death has been foreclosed by the claimant's refusal to
permit this form of investigation, the claimant has simply failed to
produce a form of available proof which is necessary to meet his
or her burden of proof. 13
C. Evidentiary Rules
While the discovery process is much more limited in workmen's
compensation cases than in civil suits, the rules of evidence are consider-
ably broader. Section 422 is controlling in this regard:
Neither the board nor any of its members nor any referee
shall be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence
in conducting any hearing or investigation, but all findings of fact
shall be based upon sufficient competent evidence to justify
same. 1
35
This section is in general conformity with the intended liberal construction
of workmen's compensation legislation in favor of claimants. 136 The
slackened evidentiary rules have been justified on the ground that work-
men's compensation hearings are not intended to be adversary proceedings
in the same sense as civil trials. Thus, the common law and statutory rules
of evidence should not be as stringently applied as they are in the
courtroom. 13 7 Both the commonwealth and superior courts have pointed
out, however, that since the rationale of this relaxation of evidentiary rules
is the hope that legally unsophisticated claimants might proceed without
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 831 (Supp. 1975).
133. See Bucklin. Heart Disease and the Law, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q., 294, 299 (1971
Annual); LARSON, supra note 12, § 38.83, at 7-183; Wilentz, Workmen's Compensation
Problems: Causal Relationship in Cardiac Deaths, 14 J. FOR. Sci. 302, 307 (1969).
134. BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 6.20. at 69.
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 834 (Supp. 1975).
136. See note 20 and accompanying text supra; BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 6-21, at 74 &
n.140.
137. BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 6.21, at 74 & n. 139.
counsel, evidentiary rules are not to be ignored if both parties are ably
represented.138 Moreover,
it has been held that Section 422, and similar enactments appli-
cable to administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not authority
for denying parties in adversary proceedings fundamental rights
embraced by some rules of evidence. Among such fundamental
rights is that of confronting, cross-examining and refuting
witnesses. 139
D. Medical Evidence
Because a layman is ordinarly not competent to express an opinion on
medical factual causation,140 medical testimony is generally required to
establish the causal relationship between employment and injury. 141 Fur-
thermore, the medical witness must unequivocally assert that the heart
attack actually did result from the assigned cause. 142 A less direct expres-
sion of opinion falls below the requisite standard of proof and thus does not
constitute legally competent evidence sufficient to support findings of
fact. 143 Statements of medical opinion phrased in terms of "could have" "
or "could be the cause"; 145 "probably was" 1 46 or "probably a cause and
effect relationship"; 47 "highly possible" 14 8 or "very probable and highly
138. City of Pittsburgh v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 246,
315 A.2d 901 (1974); Frey v. Lehigh Eng'r Co., 202 Pa. Super. 596, 199 A.2d 287 (1964).
139. City of Pittsburgh v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 246,
248-49, 315 A.2d 901, 903 (1974).
140. Only when the relationship between cause and effect is so close that the conclusion
of causation-in-fact would be inescapable for even the untrained layman will medical
testimony not be required. See Lingle v. Lingle Coal Co., 203 Pa. Super. 464, 201 A.2d 279
(1964), distinguishing Witt v. Witt's Food Market, 122 Pa. Super. 557, 186 A. 275 (1936). In
Witt, the claimant was previously healthy and had experienced no prior cardiac difficulty, and
the manifestations of his heart injury were immediately apparent after he lifted a heavy slab of
meat. The court held that on these facts no medical testimony was required to establish
causation.
141. When there is no obvious causal relationship, medical testimony is necessary to
establish causation. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Czepurnyj, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
305, 340 A.2d 915 (1975); Malocheski v. Consolidated Cigar Co., 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
430, 316 A.2d 81 (1974); Czankner v. Sky Top Lodge, Inc., 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 220,308
A.2d 911(1973); Lingle v. Lingle Coal Co., 203 Pa. Super. 464,201 A.2d279 (1964); Washko v.
George L. Ruckno Inc., 180 Pa. Super. 606, 121 A.2d 456 (1956).
142. Vorbnoff v. Mesta Mach. Co., 286 Pa. 199, 133 A. 256 (1926); Columbus Serv. Int'l
& Underwriters Adjusting Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
441, 333 A.2d 233 (1975); Harrisburg Housing Authority v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 14
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 413, 322 A.2d 753 (1974); Reed v. Glidden Co., 13 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 343, 318 A.2d 376 (1974); Washko v. George L. Ruckno, Inc., 180 Pa. Super. 606,121 A.2d
456 (1956).
143. Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954); Columbus
Serv. Int'l & Underwriters Adjusting Co. v. W orkmen's Comp. App. Bd., 17 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 441, 333 A.2d 233 (1975); Harrisburg Housing Authority v. Workmen's Comp.
App. Bd., 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 413, 322 A.2d 753 (1974);N ashko v. George L. Ruckno,
Inc., 180 Pa. Super. 606, 121 A.2d 456 (1956).
144. Florig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 388 Pa. 419, 130 A.2d 445 (1957); Nester v. George,
354 Pa. 19, 46 A.2d 469 (1946).
145. Mohler v. Cook, 205 Pa. Super. 232, 209 A.2d 7 (1965).
146. Bonaduce v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 190 Pa. Super. 319, 154 A.2d
298 (1959).
147. McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 276 A.2d 534 (1971).
148. DiFazio v. J.G. Brill Co., 133 Pa. Super. 576, 3 A.2d 216 (1938).
possible"; 149 ",might-be related"; 1 50 or "I assume" 151 or "I presume" 152
have been held too equivocal to establish causation. On the other hand,
opinions rendered "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty,"
' 153
phrased, for example, as "I think it certainly accelerated his death, "154 "it
is my opinion that [the accident] was aggravating," 155 or "it is my opinion
[the work] precipitated that which caused his death, namely, the coronary
occlusion" 156 were all held sufficiently unequivocal to establish causation.
The witness need not establish causation to a medical certainty, 157 nor need
he rule out all other possible causes.' 58 There must in all cases be an
adequate factual basis in the record upon which the witness predicates his
opinion. An opinion based on premises not found in the record will not
support an award. 1
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In the attempt to establish a factual basis for opinion testimony of
causation, all relevant evidence will generally be admitted. '6 Yet as
previously pointed out despite the liberality contemplated by the Act in the
admission of proofs, the ordinary rules of evidence may not be entirely
disregarded. 161 Thus it has been logically and consistently held that a
referee's findings of fact may not be based wholly on hearsay. 162 Some of
the older holdings indicate, however, that hearsay testimony, normally
incompetent, becomes competent evidence of the facts and circumstances
stated therein when not objected to. 163 These cases have never been
overruled. As a practical matter, hearsay is frequently admitted for the
149. Smith v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 194 Pa. Super. 263,166 A.2d 299 (1960).
150. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Stolsky, 18 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 367, 336 A.2d
447 (1975).
151. Smith v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 194 Pa. Super. 263, 166A.2d299(1960).
152. Ferlazzo v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 200 Pa. Super. 390, 189 A.2d 189
(1963).
153. Columbus Serv. Int'l & Underwriters Adjusting Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App.
Bd., 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 333 A.2d 233 (1975).
154. Hagner v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 210 Pa. Super. 473, 233 A.2d 923 (1967).
155. Reed v. Glidden Co., 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 343, 318 A.2d 376 (1974).
156. Curran v. James Regulator Co., 157 Pa. Super. 44, 41 A.2d 443 (1945).
157. Czankner v. Sky Top Lodge, Inc., 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 220, 308 A.2d 911
(1973); Parks v. Winkler, 199 Pa. Super. 244, 181 A.2d 124 (1962).
158. Czankner v. Sky Top Lodge, Inc., 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 220, 308 A.2d 911
(1973); Hagner v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 210 Pa. Super. 473, 233 A.2d 923 (1967);Gouldnerv.
Seltzer Coal Co., 190 Pa. Super. 115, 150 A.2d 879 (1959).
159. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Czepurnyj, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 305, 340
A.2d 915 (1975); Sabatini v. Affiliated Food Distrib., Inc., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 470, 295
A.2d 845 (1972); Goebel v. Aschenbach & Miller Co., 142 Pa. Super. 315, 16 A.2d 154 (1940).
160. McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, 104 A. 617 (1918); Lopen v.
Economy Coat, Apron, Towel & Linen Supply Co., 163 Pa. Super. 593, 63 A.2d 109 (1949);
Nesbit v. Vandervort & Curry 128 Pa. Super. 58, 193 A. 393 (1937). SeePA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 834 (Supp. 1975).
161. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text supra.
162. See, e.g., Scannella v. Salerno Importing Co., 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 11,275 A.2d
907 (1971); Leber v. Naftulin, 179 Pa. Super. 22, 115 A.2d 768 (1955); Nesbit v. Vandervort &
Curry, 128 Pa. Super. 58, 193 A. 393 (1937).
163. See, e.g., Ford v. A. E. Dick Co., 288 Pa. 140, 135 A. 903 (1927); Goettel v.
Pittsburgh Coal Co., 140 Pa. Super. 516, 14 A.2d 344 (1940); Broad St. Trust Co. v. Heyl
Bros., 128 Pa. Super. 65, 193 A. 397 (1937).
additional light it may shed on the case164 or to corroborate other admiss-
ible evidence.
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Statements made to physicians by claimants for the purpose of
treatment have enjoyed special treatment for workmen's compensation
purposes:
Statements by injured workers to attending physicians for
the purpose of treatment have generally been admissible in work-
men's compensation cases. But such hearsay statements, when
made as to the cause of the injury, were excluded unless they fell
with the res gestae or were found to be "pathologically germane"
to the condition being treated. '66
Hospital records are also admissible under the Act "as evidence of the
medical and surgical matters stated therein."167 It has been recognized,
however, that the quoted language was not intended to encompass either
opinion or hearsay. 16
8
E. Who May Testify Regarding Causation
The next question concerns who is competent to render an opinion on
causation. The competency of a witness is a question of law 169 and, since
the scope of review by both the board and the courts includes errors of law,
either may reverse the referee's decision in this matter. 170 Nevertheless,
the commonwealth court has held that failure to object to the competency
of a witness will be treated as a waiver of that objection, precluding
review. 
171
The cases have tended to show a logical preference for the employee's
164. See, e.g., Codyv. S.K.F. Indus.,Inc.,447Pa. 558,291 A.2d772(1972);Giordanov.
Ralph J. Bianoc, Inc., 204 Pa. Super. 219, 203 A.2d 396 (1964); Ceccato v. Union Collieries
Co., 141 Pa. Super. 440, 15 A.2d 401 (1940).
165. Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc., 447 Pa. 558, 291A.2d 772 (1972) Irwin Sensenich Corp.
v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 518, 327 A.2d 644 (1974).
166. BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 6.21(7)(b), at 94 (emphasis added). It should be noted,
however, that since the ruling of the sipreme court in Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc., 447 Pa.
558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972), hearsay sttihients made to a physican about the cause of an
unwitnessed injury by an employee who later died from that injury are admissible, whether or
not they are "pathologically germane" or part of the resgestae. See BARBIERI, supra note 22, §
6-21(7)(b), at 95.
167. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 835 (Supp. 1975). The section goes on to state an even more
liberal rule for cases in which the claim of disability is for a period of twenty-five weeks or less
(emphasis added):
Where any claim for compensation at issue before a referee involves twenty-
five weeks or less of disability, either the employee or the employer may submit a
certificate by any qualified physician as to the history, examination, treatment,
diagnosis and cause of the condition, and sworn reports by other witnesses as to any
other facts and such statements shall be admissible as evidence of medical and
surgical or other matters therein stated and findings offact may be based upon such
certificates or such reports.
168. BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 6.21(7)(b), at 96.
169. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. H.P. Foley Co., 18 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 540, 336
A.2d 892 (1975).
170. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Vivis, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. , 350 A.2d 462
(1976); Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Krawczynski, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 176, 305
A.2d 757 (1973).
171. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Czepurnyj, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 305, 340
A.2d 915 (1975).
attending physician. 17 2 Underscoring this tendency is the lack of any
requirement in heart attack cases that claimant's medical witness be a
cardiologist. 17 3 The witness' failure to qualify as a specialist goes only to
the weight and not the competence of his causation testimony. 174 Thus,
family physicians, i.e., general practitioners, have been held competent to
establish the causal relationship in heart attack cases, 175 as have
osteopaths. 176 Even an orthopedic surgeon who had neither treated the
employee for his heart attack nor engaged in general practice, and who had
practiced exclusively in orthopedic surgery, was held competent to estab-
lish causation. 177 It is doubtful, however, that the courts would ever rule
chiropractors competent to render a medical causation opinion in a heart
attack case. 178
In sum, competent, unequivocal medical testimony will be required in
almost every case to establish the causal relationship between work and a
heart attack. The testimony must reflect not merely the possibility of a
causal relationship, but must establish with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the employment played a direct and material part in causing
the heart attack. 179 The salient inquiry, therefore, is whether the medical
witness can establish that the stress and strain of employment played a
substantial role in inducing the attack.
V. Conclusions
The background, purposes and interpretation of Pennsylvania's
Workmen's Compensation Act have been examined in relation to heart
attack claims. The 1972 amendments to the Act are a clear legislative
mandate that, henceforth, the ofttimes petty, arbitrary and ambiguous
distinctions that barred recovery for legitimate heart attack claims in the
past will cease to exist. This, in conjunction with another new provision of
the Act stating that coverage is no longer elective, 80 is conclusive
evidence that employers, and ultimately consumers, will be forced to bear
a larger share of the costs of work-related injuries than ever before.
172. See, e.g., Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Czepurnyj, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
305, 340 A.2d 915 (1975); Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Branch Motor Express, Inc., 18 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 262, 334 A.2d 847 (1975); BARBIERI, supra note 22, § 6.21(6)(e), at 84-85.
173. Lisi v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 294,331 A.2d 252
(1975).
174. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Branch Motor Express, Inc., 18 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 262, 334 A.2d 847 (1975); Lisi v. Xt orkmen's Comp. App. Bd., 17 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 294, 331 A.2d 252 (1975).
175. Russell v. Scott Paper Co., 140 Pa. Super. 84, 13 A.2d 81 (1940).
176. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Ayres Philadelphia, Inc., -_ Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
,351 A.2d 306 (1976); Lisi v. N orkmen's Comp. App. Bd., 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 294,
331 A.2d 252 (1975).
177. Fry v. Calcite Quarry Co., 460 Pa. 610, 334 A.2d 258 (1975), rev'g 14 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 347, 322 A.2d 403 (1974).
178. Chiropractors have been held competent to express an opinion only within the
scope of chiropractic medicine. McKinney Mfg. Corp. v. Straub, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
79, 305 A.2d 59 (1973).
179. See notes 140-58 and accompanying text supra.
180. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Supp. 1975).
Considering the pervasive nature of cardiovascular disease among mem-
bers of the working population, 81 the 1972 amendments are a major step
toward including within the Act's coverage a large segment of workers
who, without such amendments, might continue to go uncompensated. At
the same time, however, Pennsylvania workmen's compensation law is
ever approaching the fine line separating injury compensation from general
life and health insurance. Whether it will cross that line will depend on the
interpretation given by courts and compensation authorities to the degree
of relationship between employment and injury that will be required to
establish a compensable injury.
The prospect of spurious heart claims looms larger now. 18 2 Neverthe-
less, considering the humanitarian purposes of the Act, the more liberal
approach to causation is preferable to the old standard that often impeded
recovery of legitimate claims in an effort to prevent a few questionable
claims from being compensated.
The battleground in recent cases has been the fundamental issue of
causation. Heart attack decisions adopt the requirement of a direct test of
causation. Although the claimant's burden of proof is admittedly slight,
18 3
the compensation authorities and the courts have to date required that the
stress and strain of employment play at least a substantial, non-trivial part
in the resulting heart attack. It is clear, however, that "exertion" in the
physical sense is not prerequisite to recovery.1
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Emerging as the key figure in the compensation scheme is the referee.
The conscious purpose of both the legislature and the courts to make his
factual determinations conclusive is manifest. Given the very narrow scope
of review by the board and courts of these determinations, the two major
issues raised on appeal will usually be the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying the findings of fact, and concomitantly, whether the claimant's
medical evidence is competent as a matter of law to establish causation.
Yet to be considered is the impact that the more liberal standard for
finding a work-related heart attack may have upon the overall workmen's
compensation scheme. Critics are certain to charge that Pennsylvania's
new rules will convert workmen's compensation into a system of heart
attack insurance. Dean Larson notes, however, that in other states that have
abolished the "by accident" requirement, obtaining an award is no easy
matter. 185 The claimant must still establish causation in fact. Moreover,
studies in some of the so-called "liberal" states indicate that despite the
pervasive nature of heart ailments among the general population, heart
cases do not constitute a particularly significant element in the overall
181. See notes 3-7 and accompanying text supra.
182. See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
183. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
184. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text supra.
185. LARSON, supra note 12, § 38.83, at 7-186-87.
compensation scheme.' 86 But whether these studies show the true picture
or not, Pennsylvania's liberalized coverage scheme, while smoothing the
path to compensation, can be expected to have an adverse impact as well.
Workers can expect to be faced with more rigid physical requirements by
employers attuned to the possibility of rising workmen's compensation
costs incurred in paying the claims of high-risk employees.
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186. See E. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT, at 329-32
(1961) (discussion of the California and New York experiences). But see Wilentz, Workmen's
Compensation Problems: Causal Relationship in Cardiac Deaths, 14 J. FOR. Sci. 302,303-04
(1969) (citing the New Jersey problem).
187. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
